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love, Justice Marshall asserted a less stringent test for race-based legislation: (1) that
remedial goals must serve important governmental objectives; (2) and must be
substantially related to the attainment of
those goals. Id. at 4150. Justice Marshall
discerned two of Richmond's remedial
goals: to eradicate the effects of past racial
discrimination, and to refrain from perpetuating the effects of that discrimination.
Id. at 4150-51. This discrimination was
based on a "varied body of evidence." Id.
at 4152. A national pattern of discrimination had been set, from which Richmond
did not deviate. Set in this context, Justice
Marshall argued "Richmond's reliance on
localized, industry-specific findings is a far
cry from the reliance on generalized
'societal discrimination' which the majority decries as a basis for remedial action."
Id. He accused the majority of disingenuinely "disaggregating Richmond's local
evidence, attacking it piecemeal, and thereby conclude that no single piece of evidence ... standing alone ... suffices to prove
past discrimination." Id. at 4153. Justice
Marshall concluded that the fourteenth
amendment did not impose "such onerous
[evidentiary] obligations upon states ...
once the reality of past discrimination is
apparent." Id. at 4154.
Secondly, the Plan was valid because "it
is substantially related to the interests it
seeks to serve in remedying past discrimination .... " Id. at 4145. He pointed out
that the majority overlooked the fact that
Richmond had a previous antidiscrimination statute and race-neutral legislation
that had virtually no effect on the eradication of the past discrimination. As to the
majority's claim that the 30% target could
not be narrowly tailored to any state goal,
he proclaimed that the Court ignored the
fact that the 30% figure was patterned
directly on the Fullilove precedent.
Justice Marshall concluded by denouncing the majority's adoption of the strict
scrutiny standard for review of raceconscious remedial measures. He argued
that remedial classifications warranted a
different standard of review from "brute
and repugnant state-sponsored racism"
and that the Court's holding indicated
"that it regards racism as a phenomenon of
the past." Id. at 4155.
The Court has adopted the rigid standard of strict scrutiny as the standard of
review for benign and remedial discrimination measures. The Court's holding
expressed that laws favoring blacks over
whites must be judged by the same constitutional standard as laws favoring whites
over blacks. The result could be the undoing of many affirmative action programs
nationwide, and will serve to discourage
the enactment of future affirmative action

legislation.

- Peter T. McDowell
McAvoy v. State: A SUSPECT
STOPPED FOR DRIVING WHILE
INTOXICATED IS NOT ENTIUED
TO MIRANDA ADVICE PRIOR TO
A FIELD OR CHEMICAL SOBRIETY

TEST.
A suspect who has been detained on suspicion of driving while intoxicated is not
entitled to Miranda advice before being
asked to perform field or chemical sobriety tests according to the Court of Appeals
of Maryland. McAvoy v. State, 314 Md.
509,551 A.2d 875 (1989). In so doing, the
court of appeals upheld the decisions of
both the lower court and the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
Joseph McAvoy was stopped by police
for failing to obey a sign which prohibited
right turns on a red light. After McAvoy
was stopped, the officer and McAvoy
engaged in a discussion over whether such
a sign existed. To resolve the dispute, both
men returned to the intersection where the
alleged infraction occurred. While there,
they confirmed the existence of the sign in
question, and at that point the officer then
recognized signs of intoxication on
McAvoy. As a result, the officer requested
McAvoy to perform various field sobriety
tests. McAvoy failed the tests and was
arrested for driving while intoxicated.
Shortly after the arrest, McAvoy was
read a standard form DR-15, Advice of
Rights to a Chemical Test. This form
advised him of rights and obligations
under Maryland's implied consent law
(Maryland Transp. Code Ann. § 16-205.1),
but did not advise him of his right to counsel. McAvoy elected to take a breathalyzer
test, which determined that he had .20 percent by weight of alcohol in his blood.
After the test, McAvoy was arrested for
driving under the influence and advised of
his Miranda rights. At trial McAvoy contended that the evidence produced from
these tests was obtained by custodial interrogation and therefore not admissible
without a prior Miranda warning.
A custodial interrogation is defined in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
at 444. To counter the "inherently compelling pressures" of custodial interrogation, the Supreme Court in Miranda held
that a suspect in custody must be advised
of certain constitutional rights and may
only then voluntarily waive them if he so
chooses. Id. at 467.

McAvoy argued, and the court rejected,
that at the time of the field sobriety test he
was in custody. Even though the officer
invited McAvoy to return to the scene of
the infraction, and even though he had
subjectively decided to detain McAvoy
when he detected his intoxication, the
court held that neither element was
enough to elicit a custodial interrogation
under Miranda.
In further support of its position that
McAvoy was not in custody, the court of
appeals examined Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420 (1984). The Supreme Court
held that a temporary detention in connection with an ordinary traffic stop would
not constitute custody in order to require
Miranda advice. To remain temporary the
stop must be brief, in a public place and
the suspect must not be told that the stop
would not be brief. Accordingly, a formal
arrest would not result under Berkemer if
"[a] single police officer asked a respondent a modest number of questions and
requested him to perform a simple balancing test at a location visible to passing
motorists." McAvoy, 314 Md. at 516, 551
A.2d at 878 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at
434). Therefore, since McAvoy was stopped in a public place, never told that his
detention would not be brief, and the stop
was in fact brief, he was not in custody
according to Berkemer and the court of
appeals. Furtheql1ore, during the stop, the
officer only asked McAvoy to perform
some field tests and did not interrogate
him in any manner. McAvoy, 314 Md. at
517, 551 A.2d at 879.
After completion of the field sobriety
test, however, McAvoy was formally
arrested, taken into custody and asked to
submit to a breathalyzer test. Nonetheless,
the court held that McAvoy was still not
entitled to Miranda advice because "[t]he
breath taken from [him] was physical evidence and was not testimonial within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination." Id. at 518,
551 A.2d at 879. This fifth amendment
protection "bars the State only from compelling 'communications' or 'testimony'.
Since a blood [or breath] test was 'physical
or real' evidence rather than testimonial ... " it is not protected. South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559. McAvoy therefore had no right to Miranda advice prior
to the breathalyzer test.
The court of appeals further dismissed
the argument that the officer's simple
request of McAvoy to take a chemical
sobriety test constituted an interrogation
within the meaning of Miranda. Id. at 518,
551 A.2d at 879. According to the identical
holding in Neville, supra., the police
inquiry "is highly regulated by state law,
and is presented in virtually the same
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words to all suspects." 459 U.S. at 564, n.
15. Since the officer's inquiry was not
designed to elicit testimonial evidence
from McAvoy, again no Miranda advice
was required.
The right that McAvoy did possess, and
which was not infringed, was the right not
to be unreasonably refused counsel if
requested. In addressing McAvoy's contentions in this regard, the court of appeals
relied on Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 481
A.2d 192 (1984), which holds that "a person under detention for drunk driving
must, on request, be permitted a reasonable
opportunity to communicate with counsel
before submitting to a chemical sobriety
test ... " Id. 300 Md. at 717-18,481 A.2d at
192 (emphasis added). However, the right
to counsel is limited only to circumstances
that "will not substantially interfere with
the timely and efficacious administration
of the testing process." Id. Since McAvoy
had neither requested counsel nor been
formally charged with a crime, the court
found that his Sixth Amendment rights
were also not violated.
By holding that a suspect is not entitled
to Miranda advice prior to either a field or
chemical sobriety test, the court of appeals
has merely adopted the prevailing law set
forth by the Supreme Court jn its
decisions of Berkemer and Neville. The
decision still insures that a suspect will not
be deprived of counsel if requested. However, the court is further guaranteeing that
persons who drive while intoxicated will
nonetheless be accountable for such
imprudent acts.

- Timothy Mitchell
Fairchild Space Co. v. Baroffio: "EARLY
BIRD" EMPLOYEE NOT ELIGIBLE

FOR WORKERS' COMPENSAnON
UNDER TIlE COMING AND
GOING RULE
In Fatrchild Space Co. v. Baroffio, 77 Md.
App.494, 551 A.2d 135 (1989), the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland held that
an "early bird" employee who was told by
her supervisor to report to work early was
not eligible for workers' compensation for
injuries sustained on her way to work. As
a result, the court limited the application
of the "dual purpose" and "special errand
or mission" exceptions under the "coming
and going" rule.
Susan Baroffio, the appellee, was an
Associate Contract Administrator for
Fairchild Space Company, the appellant.
Her duties sometimes required her to
work overtime without pay. On Friday,
September 5, 1986, she was told by her
supervisor to arrive at work one-half hour

early on Monday to prepare a presentation. In preparation for the presentation,
the appellee worked late on Friday, returned to work on Saturday and worked at
home on Sunday evening. On Monday,
Ms. Baroffio left for work one-half hour
earlier than normal by her usual route and
was injured in a car accident.
Ms. Baroffio filed a claim for compensation with the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission. The Commission
made an "Award of Compensation"
which Fairchild appealed to the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County, which
affirmed the Commission's award. Fairchild then appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland where both parties
agreed to proceed on an expedited appeal
and an agreed statement of facts.
To begin its analysis, the court examined
the language of the "coming and going"
rule. The court noted that while the
Workers' Compensation Act was designed
to provide compensation for work-related
injuries, injuries sustained while traveling
to or from the work place are not covered.
Id. at 497,551 A.2d at 136, (citing, Gilbert
& Humphreys, Maryland Workers' Com·
pensation Handbook, §6.6 (1988». There
are, however, two applicable exceptions to
this rule which allow an injured employee
to receive compensation for injuries sustained while coming and going to the
work place.
The court first applied the "dual purpose" exception which states:
Injury during a trip which serves both
a business and a personal purpose is
within the course of employment if
the trip involves the performance of a
service for the employer which would
have caused the trip to be taken by
someone even if it had not coincided
with the personal i n j u r y . ,
1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law,
§ 18.00 (1965). If an employee chooses to
work at home for her convenience, coming and going to work is not for a business
purpose within the exception. Id., § 18.33
at 4-316. Based upon this, the court found
no evidence that Ms. Baroffio was required
to work at home, rather, it was a matter of
her personal preference, and concluded
that her injuries did not fall within the
dual purpose exception.
In support of this conclusion, the court
found Stoskin v. Board of Educ. of Mont·
gomery County, 11 Md. App. 335, 274 A.2d
397 (1971) to be directly on point.) In
Stoskin, a school teacher who was told by
the principal to study certain books prior
to the first day of school, attempted to rely
on the "dual purpose" exception after
being injured on her way to work. Even
though the teacher was in the course of her
employment when reviewing the books,

the court found no evidence that she was
required to work at home. The Stoskin
court found the "dual purpose" exception
inapplicable because the teacher's review
ended before she began her trip to work
the following day.
The court next proceeded to address the
appellee's primary argument, that her
injury was compensable under the "special
errand or mission" exception. This exception provides:
When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his
employment, makes an off-premises
journey which would normally not be
covered under the usual going and
coming rule, the journey may be
brought within the course of employment by the fact that the trouble and
time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency
of making it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part
of the service itself.
1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation lAw, §
16.11 (1985). The court rejected this exception, and noted that the exception usually
applies to employees who are regularly
"on call" and are subsequently injured on
their way to work. Fairchild, 77 Md. App.
at 500, 551 A.2d at 139. The court of special appeals reiterated its finding in Coats &
Clark's Sales Corp. v. Stewart, 39 Md. App.
10, 13, 383 A.2d 67, 70 (1978) that "the
essential characteristic of a special errand
or mission is that it would not have been
undertaken except for the obligation of
employment."
The court also found Trent v. Collin S.
Tuttle & Co., 20 A.D.2d 948, 249 N.Y.S. 2d
140 (1964) persuasive in its rejection of the
special errand exception. In Trent, an executive secretary who was required to turn
in a report early the next day, worked late
and completed the report at home. She left
early the following morning and was
injured on her way to work. The New
York court rejected her argument that the
"special errand" exception applied. That
court held that travel to and from work is
not a risk of employment unless the
employee's home is really a second
employment location where services are
required to be rendered. Fairchild, 77 Md.
App. at 502, 551 A.2d at 139.
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland applied the New York court's
rationale and found that Fairchild did not
require Ms. Baroffio to work at home and
that the "special errand or mission" exception to the "coming and going" rule did
not apply. In so holding, the court has
declined to expand workers' compensation
laws to include an employee who is
required to report to work early.

- Michael P. Sawicki

----------------------------------19.3 I The Law Forum-37
/

